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Gaming the System: Protecting Consumers
from Unconscionable Contractual
Forum-Selection and Arbitration Clauses
Linda S. Mullenix*
The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Atlantic Marine v. U.S. District Court perhaps
usefully resolved the issue of the appropriate procedural means for ascertaining the
proper court where the parties’ agreement includes a forum-selection clause. However,
the Court’s decision was predicated on the presupposition that the forum-selection
clause was valid—a presupposition that begged that threshold question. Thus, the
Court’s presupposition threw a significant set of antecedent questions into legal limbo,
namely: (1) what body of law applies to evaluate the validity and enforceability of a
forum-selection clause, (2) what court should make that determination, and (3) when
should that determination be made? This Article explores the problem of forumselection, choice-of-law, and arbitration clauses in the context of the federal courts’
longstanding fixation on the problem of creative forum-shopping and other
gamesmanship to gain litigation advantage, strategies the courts have long eschewed.
Nonetheless, despite the concerted efforts of courts and legislators to thwart such
techniques through judicial fiat and legislative enactment, actors in the judicial arena
continue to invent resourceful methods to circumvent new constraints. This Article
argues that consumer forum-selection and arbitration clauses ought to be viewed
through the lens of litigation gamesmanship, as procedural means whereby corporate
defendants are able to establish forum advantage without any countervailing benefit to
consumers who unwittingly agree to such clauses. The Court consistently has turned a
blind eye and deaf ear on the problem of consumer forum-selection and arbitration
clauses, instead merging consideration of consumer agreements with jurisprudence
developed in the dissimilar context of sophisticated business partners freely negotiating
at arm’s length. The Court’s continued failure to distinguish and address the problem of
consumer forum-selection and arbitration clauses—left unchanged or worsened by
Atlantic Marine—calls for legislative action to close this legal advantage conferred on
corporate defendants who exploit it to their economic benefit.

* Morris & Rita Atlas Chair in Advocacy, University of Texas School of Law,
lmullenix@law.utexas.edu.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court loves forum-selection clauses. It has told us so
at least four times.1 In the most recent consideration of such clauses, the
Court in Atlantic Marine Construction Co. v. U.S. District Court
resolved a conflict among the lower federal courts concerning the
appropriate procedural means for ascertaining the proper court in
litigation where the parties’ agreement included a forum-selection
clause.2 We now know that when a party invokes a forum-selection
clause, the proper means for locating the appropriate forum is through a
transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),3 rather than through a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6), or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.4 In
addition, a court’s consideration of the transfer motion is governed by the
jurisprudence for § 1404(a) transfers, and not jurisprudential principles
governing motions to dismiss for a lack of venue, improper venue, or
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.5
While resolving this procedural problem, however, the Court
notably failed to address the most vexing problems relating to litigation
that involves forum-selection clauses: namely, what law applies to
determine the validity and enforceability of the clause, which court
makes that determination, and when such a determination is appropriately
made. Thus, perhaps the Court’s most significant and important admission
in Atlantic Marine is in footnote 5, where the Court simply noted that its
“analysis presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”6
The Court’s unanimous decision, centering on § 1404(a) transfers, begs
the primary question of which court should determine the validity of a
forum-selection clause, subject to what law, and when.7 This inquiry is

1. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc.
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988); The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). Actually, the Supreme Court really, really loves forumselection clauses. The Court has enforced every forum-selection clause in an international contract
that has come before it. In addition to the above decisions, see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A.
v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540–42 (1995); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519–20 (1974).
2. See generally Sarah Sheridan, Note, Atlantic Marine v. J-Crew: The Future of ForumSelection Clauses in Federal Courts, 9 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y Sidebar 1 (2013); Matthew J.
Sorensen, Note, Enforcement of Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine,
82 Fordham L. Rev. 2521 (2014); David K. Duffee et al., U.S. Supreme Court Reaffirms That ForumSelection Clauses Are Presumptively Enforceable, Bus. L. Today (Jan. 2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
blt/2014/01/keeping_current_duffee.html.
3. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579–80.
4. Id. at 577–79.
5. Id. at 579–80.
6. Id. at 581 n.5.
7. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 35 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“But the
Court’s description of the issue begs the question: what law governs whether the forum-selection clause is
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further muddled by the Court’s determination that in cases involving
forum-selection clauses and § 1404(a) transfers—unlike transfer cases
not involving forum-selection clauses—the law of the forum does not
transfer to the transferee court.8
This Article examines the unresolved questions left open by the
Court’s Atlantic Marine opinion, focusing on the question concerning a
threshold determination of the validity and enforceability of forumselection clauses. The Court has opened the door to this inquiry by virtue
of footnote 5. If we reject the Court’s presupposition that a forumselection clause is valid, then at least three legitimate questions arise:
(1) What body of law applies to evaluate the validity and enforceability of a
forum-selection clause? (2) What court should make that determination?
(3) When should that determination be made? Furthermore, how might
the answers to these possible questions intersect with the Court’s
conclusions in Atlantic Marine?
Part I briefly discusses the Court’s Atlantic Marine decision against
the background of the Court’s other forum-selection clause decisions. In
particular, it focuses on Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Stewart
Organization v. Ricoh,9 where Justice Scalia at least seemed interested in
the antecedent question concerning judicial determination of the validity
and enforceability of a forum-selection clause, as well as the applicable
law to make that determination.10 Needless to say, Justice Scalia’s
concerns in Ricoh seem not to have resurfaced in Atlantic Marine, unless
those concerns were subsumed and accounted for by footnote 5.
Part II then discusses the Court’s enduring fixation on litigation
gamesmanship, with particular attention to the problem of forum
shopping.11 The Court has consistently eschewed litigation
gamesmanship and attempted to constrain all forms of creative forum
shopping. Here this Article makes two points. First, the judiciary’s
evolving jurisprudence has not only failed to prevent gamesmanship, but
has instead fostered inventive procedural circumventions by practicing
attorneys. No matter what the courts attempt to do to rein in
gamesmanship—by statute, rule, or judicial opinion—attorneys still
manage to invent new means to gain litigation advantage through
a valid or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the parties. If it is invalid, i.e., should be
voided, between the parties, it cannot be entitled to any weight in the § 1404(a) determination.”).
8. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (“[W]hen a party bound by a forum-selection clause flouts its
contractual obligation and files suit in a different forum, a § 1404(a) transfer of venue will not carry
with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules—a factor that in some circumstances may affect publicinterest considerations.” (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981)).
9. 487 U.S. at 33–41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. Id.
11. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (“[T]win aims of the Erie rule [are the]
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”); Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 n.6 (1938).
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creative pre- and postlitigation practices. This is why we continue to have
these cases. For the most part, courts have focused on postfiling
procedural tactics, while paying less attention to prelitigation
gamesmanship to achieve strategic advantage. Although courts have
sought to avert egregious preemptive devices such as corporate
reincorporation across state borders to achieve or defeat diversity
jurisdiction, courts have not viewed forum-selection clauses through the
lens of prelitigation gaming tactics. In the realm of consumer contracts,
an appreciation of forum-selection and arbitration clauses as another
form of sophisticated gamesmanship, presumably eschewed by the Court,
ought to merit some attention and consideration. As will be discussed, this
involves reframing the debate as a question of undesirable gamesmanship.
Second, the Court’s forum-selection clause jurisprudence continues
to perpetuate a muddled set of principles. It consistently fails to
distinguish among parties to litigation, applying the same principles to
cases involving uninformed consumers as to sophisticated business
entities. In addition, if litigation arises in the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction,
federal law applies to assess the validity and enforceability of a forumselection clause, but no such body of federal contract doctrine applies to
forum-selection clause litigation in the Court’s diversity or federal
question jurisdiction. As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent in Stewart,
this anomaly gives rise to an array of strategic litigant behavior and
gaming opportunities, which result in unsatisfactory and inconsistent
outcomes depending on those choices.12 The gaming scenarios
envisioned by Justice Scalia in his Stewart dissent have not been
mitigated by Atlantic Marine. Instead, Atlantic Marine has further
complicated this terrain by failing to answer these questions as well, or
answering them with a variant set of rules for different situations. Finally,
in the realm of arbitration clauses—analogized by the Court to forumselection clauses13—the Court has determined that the Federal Arbitration
Act preempts application of state unconscionability jurisprudence, thus
giving primacy to federal law and leaving scant room for consumers
wishing to challenge such clauses.14
Part III then focuses on the implications of Atlantic Marine for
forum-selection clauses in consumer contracts, and by analogy to
arbitration clauses. This discussion reiterates the theme of questions left
unanswered by the Atlantic Marine decision, noting that the Atlantic
Marine litigation involved a contractual agreement between sophisticated
business entities. Thus, the Court had no reason to address enforceability
problems in consumer contracts. Given the pervasive utilization of such

12. 487 U.S. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 36 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
14. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
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clauses, including arbitration clauses, by business entities in consumer
transactions, the Court’s jurisprudence fails to provide adequate protection
to consumers who are unwitting parties to unconscionable agreements.
Atlantic Marine’s presupposition that such clauses are valid means that a
consumer plaintiff will have her dispute transferred to the contractual
forum preference, or adjudicated pursuant to alternative dispute
resolution techniques apart from the court system. But if a consumer
instead chooses to challenge the validity of a forum-selection clause,
Atlantic Marine has left the parties in doctrinal limbo concerning what
law, what forum, and the timing of such determination.
This Article concludes by contending that the problems in this arena
cannot effectively be resolved by rule revision or further doctrinal
elaboration. Instead, the doctrinal uncertainties engendered by Atlantic
Marine ought to be remedied by a federal statute setting forth substantive
principles that apply to forum-selection (and choice-of-law) provisions in
consumer contracts, but that do not confer any presumptive validity on
such provisions. In essence, such statutory provisions should set forth a
body of contract unconscionability principles that would apply in all
cases within the federal court’s jurisdiction and, in the same fashion as
the Federal Arbitration Act, preempt varying state law.

I. ATLANTIC MARINE: The Supreme Court’s Latest Voyage in
Forum-Selection Clauses
A. Answered Questions: What the Court Decided
Whether one agrees with the outcome in Atlantic Marine or not, the
Court’s decision did resolve one of those quirky problems that had
inspired a vexing conflict among the lower federal courts concerning the
interrelationship of contractual forum-selection clauses and attempts to
implement forum selection according to those clauses.15 As Justice
Roberts might characterize this decision, a unanimous Court in Atlantic
Marine exercised its function of calling balls and strikes (in this instance,
calling a series of three strikes against the plaintiff, and sending them
back to the dugout for another at-bat in Texas).16
The essential problem in Atlantic Marine addressed the issue of the
appropriate procedural means to effectuate a contractual forum-selection
clause, particularly in cases where a plaintiff sued a defendant in some
locality other than the contractual forum. In such cases, defendants

15. See generally Sorensen, supra note 2 (comprehensively discussing and analyzing split among
federal courts concerning appropriate procedural means for implementation of a forum-selection clause).
16. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of Judge
John G. Roberts, Jr.) (“I will remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”).
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typically invoke and seek enforcement of the forum-selection clause in
the plaintiff’s chosen forum, requesting to have the litigation relocated to
the contractual forum or otherwise dismissed from the plaintiff’s choice
of forum.
The nub of the issue that percolated among federal courts centered
on a disagreement concerning the proper procedural approach to enforcing
a forum-selection clause. Litigants and courts resorted to a dazzling array
of different procedural options to construe and implement a forumselection clause.17 First, some defendants invoked Federal Rule
12(b)(3)18 and sought to have the case dismissed for a lack of proper
venue.19 Second, some defendants invoked 28 U.S.C. § 140620 alleging
improper venue, and sought to have the court relocate the case to the
“proper” venue pursuant to the forum-selection clause.21 Third, other
defendants instead relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),22 arguing for a change
of venue for the convenience of the parties and in the interests of
justice.23 In more unusual scenarios, other defendants looked to Rule
12(b)(6),24 Rule 12(c),25 and Rule 5626 to dismiss the case altogether on

17. See Maxwell J. Wright, Note, Enforcing Forum-Selection Clauses: An Examination of the
Current Disarray of Federal Forum-Selection Clause Jurisprudence and a Proposal for Judicial
Reform, 44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1625, 1639–42 (2011) (collecting cases).
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) permits a defendant, before
answering, to bring a motion to dismiss for “improper venue.” Neither the federal venue statute nor
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure define “wrong” or “improper” venue. See generally 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1391–1413 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Petersen v. Boeing Co., 715 F.3d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing district court’s
decision to enforce a forum-selection clause under Rule 12(b)(3) for abuse of discretion); Union Elec.
Co. v. Energy Ins. Mut. Ltd., 689 F.3d 968, 970–74 (8th Cir. 2012) (examining Rule 12(b)(3) and
§ 1406(a) as procedural devices to give effect to forum clauses); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators,
Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding Rule 12(b)(3) and § 1406(a) are the procedural vehicles
for dismissing or transferring an action that has been brought in an improper forum); Murphy v.
Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing proper treatment of disputed facts
relating to a forum-selection clause on a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, citing authorities).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Section 1406(a) mandates dismissal or transfer of a “case laying venue in the
wrong division or district.” The district court has discretion to choose between transfer and dismissal in
evaluating motions pursuant to § 1406(a).
21. See Union Elec. Co., 689 F.3d at 970–74.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (motion to transfer for the convenience of the parties and in the interest
of justice).
23. See United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. A-12-CV-228-LY,
2012 WL 8499879, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2012) (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) as the appropriate
procedural mechanism when invoking a forum-selection clause, but holding that Atlantic Marine
failed to show that transfer pursuant to this provision would be in the interest of justice or increase the
convenience of the witnesses and the parties); see also Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v. M/V Heinrich J,
762 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (surveying district court case law); Se. Consulting Grp.,
Inc. v. Maximus, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 2d 681, 683–84 (S.D. Miss. 2005) (same).
24. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted). See Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 387 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001) (surveying “the
variegated views among the circuits concerning the appropriate vehicle for a motion to dismiss based on a
forum-selection clause”); Lawson Steel, Inc. v. All State Diversified Prods., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1750,
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dispositive grounds.27 Finally, yet other litigants invoked the federal
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens to accomplish a dismissal
from the plaintiff’s chosen forum.28
The Supreme Court in Atlantic Marine seemingly cut through this
procedural Gordian knot and set forth a simple set of negative and
positive precepts relating to the enforcement of forum-selection clauses.
Distilled to its essence, Atlantic Marine held the following: First, a party
seeking to enforce a forum-selection clause cannot seek dismissal under
28 U.S.C. § 1406 (a) or Rule 12(b)(3).29 Second, a forum-selection clause
should be enforced through a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a).30 Third, a forum-selection clause that designates a state or a
foreign forum can be enforced through application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.31 Fourth, the Court declined to consider whether
a defendant could use a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to enforce a forum-selection
clause.32

2010 WL 5147905, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 23, 2010) (citing Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 830 (7th
Cir. 1995)) (“The Circuit Courts of Appeal are split on the general question of whether a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion may be used to dismiss a case for improper venue based on a forum selection clause. Approval of
Rule 12(b)(6) as a mechanism to dismiss a case for improper venue based on a forum selection clause has
been deemed a minority view, however.” (citation omitted)). Two circuits held Rule 12(b)(6) as the
appropriate mechanism for enforcing forum-selection clauses. See Silva, 239 F.3d at 387; Instrumentation
Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elecs. (Can.) Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 6 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988); see generally Brief of Professor
Stephen E. Sachs as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013) (No. 12-929) (arguing defendant in a breach-of-contract action should be able
to obtain dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff files suit in a district other than the one specified in
a valid forum-selection clause).
25. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (motion for a judgment on the pleadings); see, e.g., NYMET Indus.
Solutions, Inc. v. Maersk, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding forum-selection
clause enforceable; granting defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c)).
26. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment as a matter of law); see Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 588, 595 (1991) (enforcing a forum-selection clause via summary judgment);
Rogen v. Memry Corp., 886 F. Supp. 393, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“‘[S]ummary judgment is an
appropriate vehicle to assess the enforceability of a forum selection clause.’” (quoting Grissom v.
Colotti, 644 F. Supp. 903, 904 (D.P.R. 1986))).
27. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
28. See Aguas Lenders Recovery Grp. v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)) (holding where parties contract to a permissive forumselection clause “that designates a forum in advance, but does not preclude a different choice, the M/S
Bremen presumption of enforceability does not apply; instead, in such cases, the traditional forum non
conveniens standards apply”); Kanza Constr., Inc. v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., No. 13-CV-0489-WDGK, 2014 WL 1356676 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 7, 2014) (holding subcontractor’s motion to dismiss on forum
non conveniens grounds, based on mandatory forum-selection clause, was warranted).
29. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 577–79.
30. Id. at 579–80.
31. Id. at 580.
32. Id. The Court declined to evaluate the Rule 12(b)(6) procedural option on the grounds that the
defendant had not sought to enforce the forum-selection clause through this provision, and that the issue
had not been briefed to the Court. However, the Court further indicated that even if a defendant could
use Rule 12(b)(6) to enforce a forum-selection clause, it would not change the conclusion that § 1406(a)
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Elaborating on its fundamental conclusion that forum-selection
clauses should be enforced through a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), the Court further opined that “when the parties have agreed
to a valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily
transfer the case to the forum specified in that clause.”33 The presence of
a valid forum-selection clause should be given controlling weight in all
but the most exceptional circumstances.34 Conversely, courts should deny
a motion to transfer only under extraordinary circumstances that are
unrelated to the convenience of the parties.35
In addition, the Court announced that courts now needed to modify
the “calculus” governing § 1404(a) transfers in three additional ways.36
First, the plaintiff’s choice of forum merited no weight.37 Instead, the
plaintiff resisting transfer to the contractual forum henceforth carried the
burden of establishing that the transfer was unwarranted.38 Second, in
evaluating a defendant’s § 1404(a) transfer motion, courts should not
consider arguments about the parties’ private interests, an inquiry that
typically informs a traditional transfer motion.39 Third, on a § 1404(a)
transfer based on a forum-selection clause, the case would not carry with
it the original venue’s (the transferee court’s) choice-of-law rules.40 In so
ruling, the Court carved out an exception—for forum-selection clause
cases only—to the principles from Van Dusen v. Barrack and Ferens v.
John Deere Co. that govern the applicable law on transfer motions.41

and Rule 12(b)(3) were not the proper mechanisms to enforce a forum-selection clause. The ruling on the
Rule 12(b)(6) argument was effectively the third strike, or at least, called as a foul ball.
33. Id. at 581.
34. Id. The Court did not define what such exceptional circumstances might be.
35. Id. The Court did not suggest what such extraordinary circumstances might be, noting that no
exceptional circumstances were presented by the underlying facts in the case.
36. Id. at 581–84.
37. Id. at 581.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 582 (“When parties agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to challenge
the preselected forum as inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their
pursuit of the litigation. A court accordingly must deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in
favor of the preselected forum.”).
40. Id. at 582–83.
41. See generally Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (holding transferee court applies
law of transferor court on plaintiff’s motion for transfer); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964)
(holding transferee court applies law of transferor court on defendant’s motion for transfer).
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B. Unanswered Questions: What the Court Did Not Decide, or,
Confounding Choice-of-Law Implications

1.

Mitigating the Harshness of Atlantic Marine: All Those
Qualifiers

The purpose of this Article is not to evaluate the legitimacy of the
Court’s reasoning in Atlantic Marine or its conclusions concerning the
appropriate procedural mechanism for enforcing a forum-selection clause.
Rather, taking as given the Court’s core ruling that § 1404(a) provides
the proper vehicle for a defendant’s invocation of a forum-selection clause,
this Article instead focuses on the opaque and somewhat discouraging
doctrine for consumers engendered by the Court’s opinion, as well as
crucial issues the Court failed to address.
In the realm of doctrinal murkiness, it is unclear whether, postAtlantic Marine, forum-selection clauses are presumptively valid unless
somehow and somewhere proven otherwise. In various portions of the
opinion, the Court seemed to nudge its pronouncements in the direction
favoring such presumptive validity.42
Nonetheless, the Court’s opinion is littered with qualifying language
and rhetoric that presumably leaves open several avenues by which a
dissenting party might challenge a forum-selection clause in the future.
Whether these fissures in the Court’s decision will provide meaningful
opportunities to contest the possible transfer or dismissal of a case
pursuant to a forum-selection clause remains unclear, but this seems
highly unlikely given the overall tone of the Court’s pronouncements.
Thus, judges in forthcoming decisions will have the unhappy task of
providing some content to Atlantic Marine’s qualifying language.
For example, in contemplating situations where parties have agreed
to a contractual forum-selection clause, the Court has inverted (actually,
completely abandoned) the usual federal court deference to a plaintiff’s
choice of forum. Instead, the Court announced that henceforth a
plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight.43 Thus, a plaintiff who
attempts to resist a forum-selection clause has the burden to establish
that a transfer to the forum for which the parties bargained is
unwarranted.44 This weasel word in the Court’s opinion provides scant
content to the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden of establishing what
constitutes a warranted or an unwarranted transfer.
As indicated above, the Court in Atlantic Marine substantially
modified the test for a § 1404 transfer of venue, stripping that inquiry of
consideration of private interest factors that undergird traditional forum

42. See infra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
43. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581.
44. Id.
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non conveniens analysis.45 The Court twice noted in its opinion that
when a defendant files a § 1404(a) transfer motion, a district court should
transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the
convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer.46 The Court concluded
that no such exceptional factors were present in the case, leaving one to
wonder what the district court has left to do on remand.47 Further, the
Court opined that since public interest factors rarely defeat a transfer
motion,48 “the practical result is that forum-selection clauses should
control except in unusual cases.”49 One assumes that on remand the
federal district court for the Western District of Texas is supposed to
heed the Supreme Court’s overtones.
What the Court has not told us in Atlantic Marine is what remaining
extraordinary or exceptional public interest factors will defeat a motion
to transfer or dismiss a case pursuant to a forum-selection clause. In
addition, the Court has not told us what unusual cases will overcome a
defendant’s motion to transfer or dismiss.
Justice Alito, citing Justice Kenney’s concurring opinion in Stewart,
reiterated that proper application of § 1404(a) requires that a forumselection clause be “given controlling weight in all but the most
exceptional cases.”50 But the Atlantic Marine decision fails to indicate
what types of cases (or circumstances) qualify as exceptional so as to
provide less heft to consideration of a forum-selection clause. In the
relatively few post-Stewart instances where a plaintiff invoked Justice
Kennedy’s “exceptional case” qualification, courts have concluded that
plaintiffs had not met the burden of showing that the case provided the
exceptional circumstances in which the clause should not be enforced

45. See id. at 582.
46. Id. at 575, 581 (“Only under extraordinary circumstances unrelated to the convenience of the
parties should a § 1404(a) motion be denied.”).
47. Id. at 581, 584 (“Although no public-interest factors that might support the denial of Atlantic
Marine’s motion to transfer are apparent on the record before us, we remand the case for the courts
below to decide that question.”).
48. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508–09 (1947) (defining public interest factors as
embracing administrative difficulties such as docket congestion; burden of jury duty imposed on
citizens in a location with no relationship to the litigation (that is, the competing interests of forums);
and difficulties presented by application of choice-of-law questions); see also Piper Aircraft Co. v.
Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260–61 (1981) (Gulf Oil public interest factors favored litigation in Scotland). See
generally Michael M. Karayanni, The Myth and Reality of a Controversy: “Public Factors” and the
Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine, 21 Wis. Int’l L.J. 327, 330, 335–63 (2003) (arguing that the
distinction between private and public law factors in Gulf Oil is incoherent); 14D Charles Alan
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3828.4 (4th ed. 2013) (citing forum non
conveniens cases illustrating the balancing of private and public interests).
49. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (emphasis added).
50. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 579 (emphasis added) (citing Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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because it was unreasonable.51 Thus, Justice Kennedy’s “exceptional cases”
qualification, rotely recited in Atlantic Marine, is likely to remain a
toothless tiger for parties opposing application of a forum-selection
clause.
As indicated above, the Atlantic Marine decision was predicated on
the presupposed validity of the forum-selection clause in that case. But
other assumptions pervade the Court’s decision. In declaring that judges
should no longer consider private interest factors relating to party
convenience on a § 1404(a) transfer motion, the Court concluded that
this was justified because any inconvenience resulting from being forced
to litigate in a contractual forum “‘was clearly foreseeable at the time of
contracting.’”52
That conclusory pronouncement begs the question whether this is
indeed factually true in any particular case. Thus, the problem of a
reasonable foreseeability of inconvenience to the parties has substantial
relevance to cases involving consumer contracts, where it is highly
unlikely that the “contracting” consumer either has knowledge of the
forum-selection clause or has reasonably calculated and waived the
consumer’s relative inconvenience if she subsequently seeks remediation.
Summing up, what we have here is a bleak house, at least for
consumers ensnared unknowingly and unwittingly by forum-selection
clauses inserted into ordinary consumer contracts. On the one hand, the
Court decorated the Atlantic Marine decision with lots of ornamental
modifiers intended, one supposes, to soften the impact of its actual harsh
consequences. Thus, we have the language of unwarranted, unusual,
exceptional, most exceptional, extraordinary, and unforeseeable. On the
other hand, the Court seems to be wishing litigants good luck with all
that. To make a prospective challenger’s life even more difficult, the
Court has now declared that if one gets to the point of evaluating a
transfer analysis, only public interest factors count. Only if a litigant can
somehow demonstrate any or all of the qualifying adjectives may she
avoid the effect of a forum-selection clause.

51. See Fluidtech, Inc. v. Gemu Valves, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 2d 762, 766–67 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (finding
no exceptional circumstances to render forum-selection clause unenforceable); Freedman v. Am. Online,
Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 238, 243 (D. Conn. 2003) (same); Stewart v. Dean-Michaels Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1400,
1401–02 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (“Plaintiffs here strive to convince this court that they come within some
exception recognized by the Eleventh Circuit in In re Ricoh Corporation. Not having been told by the
Eleventh Circuit what, if any, exceptional circumstances would justify choosing a forum other than the
forum provided in a forum selection clause, this court is unconvinced that either set of plaintiffs comes
within any exception.” (citation omitted)). It is difficult to locate any case in which a court has concluded
the opposite: those exceptional circumstances compel nonenforcement of a forum-selection clause.
52. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 582 (emphasis added) (“As we have explained in a different but
‘instructive’ context, ‘[w]hatever “inconvenience” [the parties] would suffer by being forced to litigate
in the contractual forum as [they] agreed to do was clearly foreseeable at the time of contracting.’” (quoting
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1972) (citing Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33)).
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2.

The Still Unresolved Chicken-and-Egg Problem
The core problem with the Atlantic Marine decision has less to do

with a collection of grey rhetorical minutiae than with the Court’s basic
premise. In its final analysis, the entire Atlantic Marine edifice is erected
on the foundational concept that the forum-selection clause in that case
was valid.53 In footnote 5 the Court simply noted that “[its] analysis
presuppose[d] a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”54 Thus, the
Atlantic Marine decision proceeds from that presupposition of validity,55
notwithstanding all the surrounding language qualifying that presupposition
in other cases.
Obviously, the Court’s analysis begs the question of what conclusions
might follow if a forum-selection clause is not valid, or not presumptively
valid. In turn, this foundational premise inspires a confounding host of
chicken-and-egg-like issues relating to a threshold determination of the
validity and enforceability of forum-selection clauses. The Court opened
the door to these inquiries by virtue of footnote 5. If we cannot rely on a
presupposition that a forum-selection clause is valid, then, at a minimum,
at least three legitimate questions arise: (1) What body of law applies to
evaluate the validity and enforceability of a forum-selection clause?
(2) What court should make that determination? (3) When should that
determination be made? Furthermore, how might the answers to these
possible questions intersect with the Court’s other conclusions in
Atlantic Marine?
These inquiries are further complicated if the contract also contains
a choice-of-law provision,56 in addition to or even in the absence of a
forum-selection clause.57 The Court in Atlantic Marine did not have to
address this additional doctrinal wrinkle because there seems not to have
been a parallel choice-of-law provision in the underlying contract.58
However, in cases where a contract includes an applicable law
provision, myriad problems emerge. Thus, a choice-of-law provision
might point to the application of law other than the law of the plaintiff’s
chosen forum. In such cases, as a matter of first instance, does the
plaintiff’s chosen forum apply its own law to determine the validity and
53. Id. at 581 & n.5.
54. Id. at 581 n.5.
55. Id. at 581.
56. See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (enforcing Florida federal
forum based on presence of choice-of-law provision in Burger King franchise agreement selecting
Florida law as applicable to disputes arising out of the contract despite the fact that the contract did
not include a forum-selection clause).
57. Id.
58. See United States ex rel. J-Crew Mgmt., Inc. v. Atl. Marine Constr. Co., No. A-12-CV-228LY, 2012 WL 8499879, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2012) (discussing forum-selection clause designating
Circuit Court of Norfolk, Virginia or U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Norfolk
Division, as chosen jurisdiction and venue).
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enforceability of the clauses, or does the choice-of-law provision compel
interpretation of validity and enforceability based on the contractual
forum’s law? Does the answer to this question vary depending on
whether the court’s authority is based on admiralty, federal question, or
diversity jurisdiction? And, if the threshold dispute centers on the
validity and enforceability of choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses,
why should another forum’s law (other than the plaintiff’s chosen
forum), govern these questions?

3.

Of Suppositions: No Court Determined the Validity or
Enforceability of the Atlantic Marine Forum-Selection Clause

These threshold problems of what court determines the validity and
enforceability of a forum-selection clause according to what applicable
law are not easily addressed and answered. The Atlantic Marine
litigation provides an interesting illustration of precisely these problems.
For example, the contractual agreement underlying the original Atlantic
Marine litigation seems not to have included a choice-of-law provision,
but only a forum-selection clause.59 The dispute between Atlantic Marine
and its subcontractor J-Crew arose out of a land-based construction
dispute (to distinguish this from the sea-based admiralty cases) that was filed
in federal court based on diversity.60 Consequently, it would appear that
under the Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins/Klaxon Co. v. Stentor doctrine,61
the court ought to have looked to Texas law to have determined the
validity and enforceability of the clause.
And, indeed, J-Crew argued precisely that: it challenged the
enforceability of the forum-selection clause based on the Texas Business
and Commerce Code, which effectively voids such provisions in
construction contract disputes.62 Nonetheless, the district court ruled that
Texas state law did not apply. This is because the construction project
giving rise to the payment dispute was in Fort Hood, Texas, a federal
enclave, and that Texas had ceded exclusive jurisdiction of Fort Hood to
the United States in 1950. Hence, federal law applied to the question of
whether Texas law voided the clause, which the district court held it did
not.63

59. Id.
60. Id. at *5.
61. See generally Klaxon Co. v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding states’ choice-of-law
regimes are substantive for Erie purposes; courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply forum state
choice-of-law principles to determine application law); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
(holding federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law but federal
procedural rules).
62. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 272.001 (West 2014) (“Voidable Contract Provision”);
J-Crew Mgmt., 2012 WL 8499879, at *2.
63. Id. at *2–3.
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That is as far as the court’s analysis went. Significantly, the district
court never determined whether the forum-selection clause, as a primary
matter, was valid and enforceable; instead the court pivoted exclusively
to lengthy digression of the appropriate procedural means for
effectuating the clause.64 This focus, in turn, dictated that the appellate
court’s review of the district court’s rulings similarly concentrated
exclusively on that question.65 Hence, the Supreme Court’s supposition
that the contested forum-selection clause in Atlantic Marine was valid
was precisely that: a supposition. The lower courts had never determined
the validity of the clause at any point in the proceedings, and certainly
had not addressed what law should apply to make that determination.
Nor did the appellate court consider these questions on review.
Theoretically, then, the validity of the forum-selection clause in Atlantic
Marine is still an open question, as well as what law applies to make that
determination.

4.

Justice Scalia on Threshold Determinations of Validity and
Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses
One might note that Justice Scalia, dissenting in Stewart, recognized
this set of problems.66 In Stewart, the majority held that when a

defendant invokes a forum-selection clause, § 1404(a) governs the issue
of whether to give effect to the parties’ forum-selection clause and
transfer the case to the designated forum.67 But the majority further held
that in conducting an analysis under § 1404(a) and evaluating the relative
private and public interests that inform a § 1404(a) request, courts must
assess countervailing arguments under federal and state law to determine
what weight to give to a forum-selection clause.68 With this pronouncement,
the Stewart majority in essence fashioned a federal common law
jurisprudence governing forum-selection clauses in diversity cases.
Justice Scalia began his dissent by agreeing with the Court’s
conclusion that the question of the validity of a forum-selection clause
falls within the analysis of a § 1404(a) transfer.69 But he disagreed that
federal courts could fashion a judge-made rule to govern this issue of
contract validity.70 Scalia opined, “Since no federal statute or [r]ule of

64. Id. at *4–9.
65. See generally In re Atl. Marine Constr. Co., 701 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2012) (deciding without
considering the threshold question of validity and enforceability of the forum-selection clause).
66. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33–41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 32 (majority opinion).
68. Id. at 30.
69. See id. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. Id.; see also id. at 37 (“Section 1404(a) is simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions
contracts or agreements, much less that the validity of certain contracts or agreements will be matters
of federal law. It is difficult to believe that state contract law was meant to be pre-empted by this

Mullenix-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

734

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

3/23/2015 5:08 PM

[Vol. 66:719

[p]rocedure governs the validity of a forum-selection clause, the
remaining issue is whether federal courts may fashion a judge-made rule
to govern the question. If they may not, the Rules of Decision Act,
28 U.S.C. § 1652, mandates use of state law.”71
Scalia further suggested that the majority’s opinion begged the
question of what law governs whether a forum-selection clause is a valid
or invalid allocation of any inconvenience between the parties. After a
lengthy Erie analysis, Scalia ultimately concluded that Erie and its
progeny mandated that state law controls the question of the validity of a
forum-selection clause.72
Thus, if a forum-selection clause was invalid and should be voided, it
is not, in Scalia’s view, entitled to any weight in the § 1404 determination.73
Moreover, Scalia protested that it was inappropriate for the determination
of a forum-selection clause’s validity to be “wrenched” from state contract
principles.74 He suggested that Congress, in enacting the Federal
Arbitration Act’s preemption provision, demonstrated that it knew how
to preempt state contract law, and “in precisely the same field of
agreement regarding forum selection.”75
Significantly, in eschewing the majority’s fashioning of a federal
common law to govern § 1404(a) transfers in forum-selection clause
cases, Scalia expressed concern that the Court’s interpretation of § 1404(a)
would lead to significant and inevitable encouragement of forum
shopping.76 In the underlying case, the Eleventh Circuit had held, as a
matter of federal law, that the parties’ forum-selection clause was valid
and required the transfer of the case to New York City, even though
Alabama state law, where the plaintiff filed suit, did not recognize the
validity or enforceability of forum-selection clauses.77 Justice Scalia
concluded that the Eleventh Circuit’s rule “clearly encourages forum

provision that we have said ‘should be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping measure.’” (quoting
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964))).
71. Id. at 38 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1938)).
72. Id. at 38–39. Accord Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 221 (2d Cir. 2014) (eschewing
creation and application of a federal common law governing the interpretation of forum-selection
clauses; arguing that contract law is quintessentially substantive for Erie purposes and therefore in the
realm of the states).
73. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 36 (“[Section] 1404(a) was enacted against the background that issues of contract,
including a contract’s validity, are nearly always governed by state law. It is simply contrary to the
practice of our system that such an issue should be wrenched from state control in absence of a clear
conflict with federal law or explicit statutory provision.”).
75. Id.; see Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (preempting state contract law). See
generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding Federal Arbitration Act
preempts California state law on contract unconscionability principles governing contractual
arbitration clauses).
76. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh, 810 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1987).
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shopping,”78 and described at least two scenarios where, as a
consequence of the majority’s holdings, litigants would attempt to game
the system:
Venue is often a vitally important matter, as is shown by the frequency
with which parties contractually provide for and litigate the issue. Suit
might well not be pursued, or might not be as successful, in a significantly
less convenient forum. Transfer to such a less desirable forum is,
therefore, of sufficient import that plaintiffs will base their decisions on
the likelihood of that eventuality when they are choosing whether to
sue in state or federal court. With respect to forum-selection clauses, in
a State with law unfavorable to validity, plaintiffs who seek to avoid
the effect of a clause will be encouraged to sue in state court, and
nonresident defendants will be encouraged to shop for more favorable
law by removing to federal court. In the reverse situation—where a
State has law favorable to enforcing such clauses—plaintiffs will be
encouraged to sue in federal court. This significant encouragement to
forum shopping is alone sufficient to warrant application of state law.79

The Court’s decision in Atlantic Marine was unanimous, so whatever
concerns or reservations Justice Scalia expressed in his Stewart dissent
were not urged again or reflected in Atlantic Marine. Certainly the Court’s
conclusion in Atlantic Marine that § 1404(a) is the procedural
mechanism for effectuating forum-selection clauses is consistent with its
prior holding in Stewart, and Justice Scalia joined with the Stewart
majority in that holding.
Nonetheless, Justice Scalia’s silence in Atlantic Marine concerning
what law applies to determine the validity of a forum-selection clause is
somewhat baffling because of the fuss he made over this question in his
Stewart dissent, emerging as a champion of state law. Several theories
suggest themselves. It could be that the Court’s presupposition in Atlantic
Marine of the validity of the forum-selection clause averted any further
discussion of what law applies to determine a clause’s validity and
therefore Justice Scalia concluded that this issue—not raised—merited
no further discussion. It could be that Justice Alito’s analysis of § 1404(a)
convinced Justice Scalia that federal law simply applies to preempt any
state law conflict. It could be that Justice Alito’s excise of private law
factors from a § 1404(a) analysis—that is, no weighing of relative
inconvenience to the parties—foreclosed discussion of underlying factual
questions relating to state contract formation principles and
unconscionability doctrine. Maybe Justice Scalia simply forgot his prior
dissenting position in Stewart. Who knows?
At any rate, the Court’s Atlantic Marine decision arguably advances
a more robust version of its Stewart holdings. Thus, the Court
determined, consistent with Stewart, that § 1404(a) applies as the
78. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 39–40 (citations omitted).
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procedural vehicle for implementing a forum-selection clause on a
transfer motion. In addition, the Court federalized the law concerning
validity of a forum-selection clause within the context of a § 1404(a)
transfer motion, pursuant to a new set of highly constricted principles
that left no room for the application of possibly conflicting state law
doctrine on contract unconscionability.

II. The Judicial System’s Longstanding Preoccupation with and
Antipathy Toward Gaming the System
A. Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction, Venue, and
Other Interesting Gambits
Assume for the purpose of discussion that Justice Scalia in his

Stewart dissent was correct with regard to forum-selection clauses, the

Court’s federalization of forum-selection clause validity, and the consequent
effects of all this on forum shopping. If Justice Scalia was correct about
the forum-shopping problem engendered by forum-selection clauses,
then, at best, nothing has changed much by virtue of the Atlantic Marine
decision.
To generalize, post-Atlantic Marine, it makes sense for plaintiffs
who might be subject to a forum-selection clause in some unfavorable
location to sue in a state court that disallows (or looks unfavorably upon)
enforcement of forum-selection clauses—say in an Alabama or
California state court. Likewise, it makes sense for a defendant in such
situations to remove to federal court and then seek transfer pursuant to
§ 1404(a), invoking the forum-selection clause and basically getting a free
pass to the contractual forum under the new Atlantic Marine forumselection clause transfer principles.
However, where state law favors enforcement of forum-selection
clauses, plaintiffs are now essentially out of luck. Plaintiffs will have little
incentive to file in either state or federal court, because it will be wellnigh impossible to successfully challenge the enforcement of a forumselection clause in either a state or federal forum.
Either way, the problem with these forum-shopping possibilities is
that forum-selection clauses will almost always provide defendants with a
“heads I win, tails you lose” forum preference. Forum-selection clauses,
then, rather unfairly stack the deck in defendants’ favor because, either
as a matter of original or removal jurisdiction, defendants will wind up in
federal court with the ability to enforce the forum-selection clause to
transfer a case to the forum of the defendant’s choosing. It may be
protested that this is not unfair given the parties’ contractual agreement,
but in consumer cases, knowing and willing agreement to the contract
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typically is not the case.80 Moreover, against this backdrop, forumselection clause jurisprudence does an inadequate job—actually a fairly
poor job—of distinguishing among types of forum-selection clause
cases.81
The Court’s forum-selection clause doctrine is built on the foundation
of contract law rather than jurisdictional jurisprudence,82 and the Court’s
four forum-selection clause opinions are suffused with rhetoric surrounding
the sanctity of contract law.83 Lower federal courts in lockstep have
endorsed the sanctity-of-contract approach to forum-selection clauses.84
Because of the enormous strategic advantage conferred by contractual
forum-selection clauses on defendants and the fundamental unfairness of
the law to consumers governing such provisions, it is thought provoking
to view forum-selection clauses, then, as a strategic mechanism to game
the system rather than through the lens of sanctified contract principles.
From this gamesmanship perspective, courts might have a different
reception to forum-selection clauses and their consequent effects on the
justness and fairness of the legal system.

1.

A Brief Historical Survey of Gamesmanship in Federal and
State Court

In this regard, federal courts have long been preoccupied with
resisting or restraining litigants’ attempts to game the system. In the
twentieth century, the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
as well as various statutory jurisdictional provisions, has served to
enhance creative means for manipulating strategic advantage in a dual

80. See, e.g., Rud v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 438 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2006) (“When
the Supreme Court in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute held enforceable a forum-selection clause
printed on the back of a cruise ticket, it brushed aside the arguments that many consumers don’t read
the fine print in their contracts and do not appreciate the significance, or perhaps even the meaning, of
a forum-selection clause.” (citation omitted)).
81. See, e.g., Silva v. Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 239 F.3d 385, 389 (1st Cir. 2001) (rejecting
argument challenging boilerplate forum-selection clause printed on back of employment contract).
82. See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Contract Law Walks the Plank: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 12 Nev. L.J. 553 (2012); Linda S. Mullenix, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute: The Titanic of
Worst Decisions, 12 Nev. L.J. 549 (2012) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Titanic of Worst Decisions];
Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual
Personal Jurisdiction, 27 Tex. Int’l L.J. 323 (1992) [hereinafter, Mullenix, Another Easy Case]; Linda
S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure
in Federal Court, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 291 (1988).
83. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Braspero Oil Servs. Co. v. Modec (USA), Inc., 240 F. App’x 612, 615 (5th Cir. 2007)
(endorsing principle that forum-selection clauses are presumptively valid and enforceable because
they eliminate uncertainty as to forum for the resolution of disputes); IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Bros.
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[The Supreme Court’s] approach is to treat a
forum-selection clause basically like any other contractual provision and hence to enforce it unless it is
subject to any of the sorts of infirmity, such as fraud or mistake, that justify a court’s refusing to
enforce a contract. Freedom of contract requires no less.”).
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court system. Not that there is anything wrong with this: this is what
attorneys zealously representing their clients are expected to do.85 Yet
federal courts have drawn distinctions between legitimate lawyering
efforts and litigation gambits that cross an impermissible line to
unacceptable gamesmanship.86
One does not have to research very extensively to discover the
courts’ historical antipathy to questionable litigation gamesmanship,
including dubious tactics that attorneys attempt in both pre- and postfiling
efforts. Much of this preoccupation with strategic gamesmanship has
focused on techniques to secure forum advantage.87 Congress and the
judiciary, in reaction to these creative lawyering ventures, have responded
with various ameliorative amended rules, statutory provisions, and sanctions
intended to fix perceived problems and to level the litigation playing field
between plaintiffs and defendants.
Beginning with the Erie decision itself,88 numerous examples
illustrate the judicial aversion to litigation gamesmanship. The Erie
Court, in addressing the problem of forum shopping to obtain the
advantage of more favorable federal common law, noted the forumshopping problem engendered by the classic Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co. case,89 where
the Brown & Yellow taxicab company, ostensibly a Kentucky corporation,
simply reincorporated over the border in Tennessee and executed its
contract there in order to gain the advantage of favorable Tennessee
contract law.90 The Erie decision thus represents a doctrinal solution
intended to frustrate the Black & White Taxicab prelitigation behavior

85. See generally Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong With That?, 24 Quinnipiac L.
Rev. 25 (2005) (defining and defending forum-shopping techniques); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 1677 (1990) (describing forum-shopping activities on a continuum; arguing that
some forum-shopping activities may enhance remediation opportunities).
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
87. Gamesmanship may take many forms during the litigation process:
Gamesmanship is also said to occur when lawyers forum shop, refuse to examine their own
witnesses in depositions to prevent opponents from gleaning information, file excessive or
unnecessary motions, institute lawsuits involving identical issues simultaneously in state and
federal courts, fail to obey court orders, employ tactical delays, file frivolous pleadings and
engage in “recreational” litigation, enter into settlement agreements in bad faith to strip
federal courts of exclusive jurisdiction, and exercise the removal jurisdiction of the federal
courts in some cases. Significantly, courts acknowledge that undue gamesmanship often
occurs within the rules of procedure. Arguably, much of the gamesmanship appears to
involve not the violation of, but rather the strategic use of, court rules.
Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It’s the Rules, 47 SMU L. Rev. 199, 207–08 (1994).
88. See generally 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
89. Id. at 73 (citing Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)).
90. Id.
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that patently was intended to manipulate forum selection and applicable
law.
Over the years, attorneys have continued to resort to all sorts of
creative means for manipulating jurisdiction. As incredible as this
sounds, prospective decedents (aided by their attorneys) accomplished
one of the more interesting subchapters in forum manipulation.91 This
curious subgroup of folks (1) anticipated their own death, (2) foresaw a
dispute over their estate, (3) understood the difference between state and
federal law, (4) desired to have any such claims litigated in federal court
rather than state court, and (5) therefore contractually designated an
out-of-state representative as the executor of the estate in order to secure
federal diversity jurisdiction.92 By the mid-1970s and ’80s there were
enough of these odd cases that the federal courts balked and Congress
stepped in to effectively resolve this type of forum manipulation by
amending the federal diversity statute.93
Statutory law,94 bolstered by judicial rulings, has repudiated litigant
efforts to secure federal jurisdiction by collusive joinder through sham
contractual assignment of rights.95 Congress and the courts, through
statutory provisions as well as decisional law, have also repudiated efforts
to defeat removal jurisdiction by plaintiffs’ improper or fraudulent joinder
of nondiverse defendants.96 The principle relating to fraudulent joinder
extends to the post-removal tactic of subsequently joining nondiverse
defendants to defeat removal and support a remand motion.97
The judicial system has further manifested its distaste for
jurisdictional gamesmanship through the doctrine of artful pleading. The
artful pleading doctrine is intended to curb creative complaint design,
whereby plaintiffs inventively massage claims or damages with the

91. See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction: Is There
Diversity After Death?, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 1011 (1985) (discussing this form of forum manipulation;
citing cases).
92. With regard to this strange line of cases, one can only wonder why a decedent would care
about applicable law after her own death.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (2012) (stating that an estate’s administrator or executor has the
same citizenship as the decedent).
94. See id. § 1659 (collusive joinder of parties); Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823
(1969) (finding collusive joinder of party through sham contract agreement violated statutory prohibition
against such collusive joinder).
95. Kramer, 394 U.S. at 824.
96. See generally 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3641.1
(3d ed. 1998) (“Devices to Defeat Diversity Jurisdiction—Joinder of Nondiverse Parties.”).
97. See, e.g., Ibis Villas at Miami Gardens Condo Ass’n, Inc. v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., 799 F.
Supp. 2d 1333, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (holding courts should be highly suspicious of joinder of
nondiverse party after removal but before discovery, for intended purpose to defeat diversity
jurisdiction); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or
permit joinder and remand the action to State court . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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intention to circumvent or defeat removal to federal court.98 Indeed,
courts and commentators have noted that congressional enactment of the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) was intended, in significant
part, to deal with plaintiffs’ gamesmanship in pursuing class action
litigation in more favorable state forums and pleading around potential
federal removal jurisdiction.99 Congress also intended, in CAFA, to
address a form of jurisdictional gamesmanship whereby plaintiffs’
attorneys filed copycat class actions, alleging the same injuries on behalf
of the same classes of plaintiffs, in multiple state courts.100
The so-called “forum defendant rule” has likewise unleashed what
one federal court has deemed “the latest litigation fad” in forumshopping gamesmanship.101 The forum defendant rule provides that a
case is removable “only if none of the parties in interest properly joined
and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which the action is
brought.”102 The particular removal language “properly joined and
served” has turned into a fruitful avenue for removal gamesmanship,
allowing defendants to seek speedy removal before any defendant is
served in state court. At least one federal court has noted,
disapprovingly, that while congressional intent in enacting the forum
defendant rule was to circumvent gamesmanship by plaintiffs,103 that
statutory language is now being deployed by defendants to game the
system:
The tactics employed by defendants such as in the instant case turn
Congressional intent on its head by allowing defendants to employ
gamesmanship, specifically by rushing to remove a newly filed state
court case before the plaintiff can perfect service on anyone. Given
that Congress intended the “properly joined and served” language to
prevent litigant gamesmanship, “it would be especially absurd to
interpret the same ‘joined and served’ requirement to actually condone

98. See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 475–76 (2009) (“If a court
concludes that a plaintiff has ‘artfully pleaded’ claims [by failing to plead a necessary federal question],
it may uphold removal even though no federal question appears on the face of the plaintiff’s complaint.
The artful pleading doctrine allows removal where federal law completely preempts a plaintiff’s statelaw claim.”).
99. See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005); see also Louisiana
ex rel. Caldwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 536 F.3d 418, 424 (5th Cir. 2008); S. Rep. No. 109–14, at 35 (2005),
as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 34 (Congress emphasized that term class action should be defined
broadly to prevent jurisdictional gamesmanship); Edward S. Sledge, IV & Christopher S. Randolph,
Jr., Setting the Edges: Defending Against Plaintiff End Runs Around CAFA, 80 Def. Couns. J. 178,
184 (2013) (“Congress specifically mentioned damage stipulations as an example of jurisdictional
gamesmanship that it sought to end.”).
100. See Tanoh v. Dow Chem. Co., 561 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (addressing argument that
plaintiffs should not be allowed to “game” jurisdiction statutes by filing copycat cases).
101. See Ethington v. Gen. Elec. Co., 575 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (noting the
“growing trend of district courts wrestling with this latest litigation fad”).
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2012).
103. Ethington, 575 F. Supp. 2d at 862.
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a similar kind of gamesmanship from defendants” in instances such as
the case at bar. In other words, “a literal interpretation of the provision
creates an opportunity for gamesmanship by defendants, which could
not have been the intent of the legislature in drafting the ‘properly
joined and served’ language.”104

The Court’s preoccupation with litigation gamesmanship extends
not only to actual practices, but to fear of potential gambits as well
(which the Court has signaled it wishes to nip in the bud). Thus, the
Court’s decision in Owens Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger105
represents perhaps one of the strangest judicial overreactions to
potential gamesmanship. There, the Court held that the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction could not be extended to permit assertion of
jurisdiction over a nondiverse party that was impleaded and sued in a
defendant’s cross-claim.
This exception to supplemental jurisdiction seemingly was predicated
on the quasi-absurd theory that the judicial system had an interest in
preventing a plaintiff from colluding with a defendant to subsequently
implead and assert a cross-claim against a nondiverse party whom the
plaintiff could not have sued originally, thereby gaining jurisdiction over
that party through assertion of supplemental jurisdiction.106 The Owen
exception, designed to head off this type of prospective gamesmanship, is
now codified in the supplemental jurisdiction statute.107
The Court’s concern with litigant forum shopping to gain advantage
is, of course, similarly manifested in its applicable law decisions. Thus, the
Court in Ferens—reflecting on its precedential Van Dusen ruling—
explained:
Van Dusen also sought to fashion a rule that would not create
opportunities for forum shopping. Some commentators have seen this
policy as the most important rationale of Van Dusen, but few attempt to
explain the harm of forum shopping when the plaintiff initiates a transfer.
An opportunity for forum shopping exists whenever a party has a choice
of forums that will apply different laws. The Van Dusen policy against

104. Id. (citing Allen v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, No. 07-5045, 2008 WL 2247067, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
May 30, 2008)); Brown v. Organon Int’l., Inc., No. 07-3092(HAA), 2008 WL 2833294, at *5 (D.N.J.
July 21, 2008) (“To apply the ‘properly joined and served’ language literally where an in-state defendant
removes, would promote the same type of litigant gamesmanship that the rule seeks to limit, and thus
violate the clear purpose of the legislative provision.”); DeAngelo-Shuayto v. Organon USA Inc., No.
07-2923(SRC), 2007 WL 4365311, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2007).
105. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
106. Id. at 374 (“The limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by
Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded. Yet under the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in
this case, a plaintiff could defeat the statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient
of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizenship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants.”); see also id. at 374–75 n.17 (explaining “this is not an unlikely hypothesis,” but that
“the requirement of complete diversity would be eviscerated by such a course of conduct”).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2012); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 573 (2005) (noting § 1367(b) codified the Owen rule).
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forum shopping simply requires us to interpret § 1404(a) in a way that
does not create an opportunity for obtaining a more favorable law by
selecting a forum through a transfer of venue. In the Van Dusen case
itself, this meant that we could not allow defendants to use a transfer to
change the law.108

Finally, judicial antipathy towards litigation gamesmanship extends
to an array of postfiling attorney behavior. Thus, in particular, courts
have criticized strategic gamesmanship during discovery proceedings,109
strategic motion practice intended to cause unnecessary delay,110 and the
filing of frivolous motions for a similar purpose.111 Courts typically deal with
these types of gamesmanship through sanctioning powers under the
federal rules,112 federal statutes,113 or through exercise of the court’s
inherent powers.114 It might be noted that, similar to other judicial
attempts to curb litigation gamesmanship, discovery practice especially
has proven entirely resistant to repeated efforts to deal with alleged
discovery abuse. Hence, the discovery provisions may claim the dubious
honor as the federal rules most repeatedly amended in efforts to restrain
litigation gamesmanship.115

108. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (citing 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
Practice and Procedure § 4506 (2d ed. 1982); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964)).
109. See, e.g., Digital Ally, Inc. v. Z3 Tech., LLC, No. 09-2292-KGS, 2012 WL 2402771, at *2
(D. Kan. June 26, 2012) (“The purpose of discovery and initial disclosures is to avoid one side ambushing
the other, and the litigants should not indulge in gamesmanship with respect to their disclosure
obligations.”); Inland Am. (LIP) SUB, LLC v. Lauth, No. 1:09-CV-00839-SEB-JMS, 2010 WL 670546,
at * 2 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 19, 2010) (“Defendant’s request for a stay of discovery smacks of the type of
gamesmanship that has no place in litigation in federal court.”); cf. Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp.,
606 F.2d 704, 710 (7th Cir. 1979) (disapproving of trial court procedures that promote “gamesmanship
aspects of litigation”). See generally Enoch, supra note 87 (citing examples).
110. See generally Enoch, supra note 87 (citing cases and example).
111. Id.
112. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (pleading sanctions); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 (discovery sanctions); Digital
Ally, 2012 WL 2402771, at *3 (“Rule 37(c) is designed to prevent the ‘sandbagging’ of an opposing
party with new evidence and prevent gamesmanship.”); CSC Holdings, Inc. v. Berube, No. 01-1650
DRH MLO, 2004 WL 3541331, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 7, 2004) (“Rule 37(c)(1) is designed to avoid”
gamesmanship and “‘to provide a strong inducement for disclosure of Rule 26(a) material.’” (citing
Hein v. Cuprum, 53 Fed. Appx. 134, 136 (2d Cir. 2002))).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (providing for sanctions for attorneys who unreasonably and
vexatious multiple proceedings).
114. See generally Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (discussing inherent power of the
courts to sanction attorneys).
115. See generally Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the U.S., Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy and Civil Procedure
(2013), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20131029053101/http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf (the proposed amendments would revise Fed. R.
Civ. P. 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 37).
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B. Forum-Selection Clauses: Muddled Jurisprudence
As we have seen, federal courts eschew various litigant tactics
intended to game the system, with forum shopping and creative
manipulation of federal jurisdiction at the top of this list followed closely
by gambits to secure preferable law. A reframing of the problem of
forum-selection clauses (as well as choice-of-law provisions and arbitration
clauses) is through the lens of litigation gamesmanship, rather than
contract law. The Court’s evolving forum-selection clause jurisprudence,
then, invites such one-sided gamesmanship.
A not insignificant problem with forum-selection clause jurisprudence,
which opens the door to such gamesmanship, is that it embraces a
complicated tangle of principles that vary according to different contexts.
This tangle works to the advantage of prospective corporate defendants
who, knowledgeable of these principles and their consequences, exploit
forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses to their advantage.
Thus, if harm occurs at sea, the litigation arises in the court’s
admiralty jurisdiction and principles of federal common law from The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. apply to assess the validity and
enforceability of a forum-selection clause.116 The Court’s Zapata decision
indicates that forum-selection clauses in the admiralty context are prima
facie or presumptively valid and should be enforced unless the resisting
party demonstrates that enforcement of the clause would be
“‘unreasonable’ under the circumstances.”117 In discussing the possible
unreasonableness of a forum-selection clause, the Zapata majority
embraced contract unconscionability analysis. Thus, the Court suggested
that a forum-selection clause was not unreasonable if it was “unaffected
by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power,” and
therefore should be given legal effect.118 These Zapata unconscionability
principles, then, apply to determine the enforceability of forum-selection
clauses in cases arising in admiralty jurisdiction for harms occurring at sea.
Litigation that arises from land-based harm, on the other hand,
generally invokes the court’s diversity jurisdiction where the party
seeking to enforce the clause urges transfer to another state or foreign
court. Until the Court decided Atlantic Marine, courts disagreed upon
whether federal common law or Erie principles applied, requiring
recourse to state contract law to interpret the validity and enforceability
of the clause.119 It is unclear whether the Atlantic Marine decision has

116. See generally The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
117. Id. at 10 (“We believe this is the correct doctrine to be followed by federal district courts
sitting in admiralty. It is merely the other side of the proposition recognized by this Court in National
Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent.” (citing 375 U.S. 311 (1964))).
118. Id. at 12–13.
119. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
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definitively resolved this debate in favor of exclusive application of
federal common law principles, but it would seem so.120 Justice Scalia did
not think this was correct in his Stewart dissent, and several lower federal
courts agreed that the Erie doctrine mandates application of state
contract law to resolve these questions.121
Nonetheless, the Court in Atlantic Marine recognized that the
invocation of a forum-selection clause in nonadmiralty cases presented a
different litigation scenario. Thus, in these contexts, having determined
that § 1404(a) is the appropriate procedural means for enforcing a
forum-selection clause, the Court explained:
[T]he appropriate way to enforce a forum-selection clause pointing to a
state or foreign forum is through the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Section 1404(a) is merely a codification of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens for the subset of cases in which the transferee
forum is within the federal court system; in such cases, Congress has
replaced the traditional remedy of outright dismissal with transfer.122

It would seem, then, that post-Atlantic Marine, one set of principles
apply to forum-selection clause cases arising in the admiralty context,
which permit (if not require) some reference to contract unconscionability
analysis, but another set of principles apply to land-based forumselection cases, which are subjected to a now restricted forum non
conveniens analysis. Indeed, in its cribbed description of what constitutes
a forum non conveniens analysis under § 1404(a) in these cases, the
Atlantic Marine decision seems to have eliminated recourse to contract
unconscionability arguments.
The complicated forum-selection clause interpretive landscape is
not limited to the simple dichotomy between sea-based or land-based
harms, with distinctions arising from admiralty, diversity, or federal question
jurisdiction. Forum-selection clause jurisprudence is further complicated
by the presence or absence of a choice-of-law provision,123 whether the
120. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 579–81 (2013).
121. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text.
122. Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 580 (citing Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 430 (2007)).
123. See, e.g., Brenner v. Nat’l Outdoor Leadership Sch., No. 13-02908 (DSD/JJG), 2014 WL
2069364, at *5 (D. Minn. May 19, 2014) (“In a transfer analysis, ‘a district court . . . must decide
whether the [forum-selection] clause applies to the type of claims asserted in the lawsuit.’” (quoting
Terra Int’l, Inc. v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 1997))). Thus, the court
interprets the forum-selection clause to determine its applicability to the instant dispute. Although
enforceability of a forum-selection clause is analyzed under federal law, where there exist both valid
forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses, the substantive law identified in the choice-of-law clause
governs interpretation of the forum-selection clause. See Atl. Marine, 134 S. Ct. at 581 (holding the
lower court “erred in failing to make the adjustments required . . . when the transfer motion is premised
on a forum-selection clause”); Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 220 (2nd Cir. 2014) (“[C]ourts
must apply the law contractually chosen by the parties to interpret the [forum-selection] clause.”). But
see Schwan’s Sales Enters., Inc. v. SIG Pack, Inc., 476 F.3d 594, 596–97 (8th Cir. 2007); Martinez, 740
F.3d at 214 (“[W]here a contract contains both a valid choice-of-law clause and a forum selection clause,
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forum-selection clause is mandatory or permissive,124 and whether the
forum-selection clause involves international commercial transactions.125
Moreover, since Zapata, the Court’s forum-selection clause
jurisprudence has arced towards a unified theory of federalized forumselection clause law, with ever more restrictive pronouncements
narrowing the ability of an opposing party to successfully challenge such
provisions. Thus, the Court has consistently refused to distinguish among
parties to litigation, applying the same principles to cases involving
uninformed and unsophisticated consumers as to cases involving
sophisticated business entities on both sides of a contract.126
C. Arbitration Clauses: Another Variation on the Theme of
Gaming the System
Finally, the Court in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.127 analogized
arbitration clauses to forum-selection clauses, declaring, “[a]n agreement
to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of
forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the
procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.”128 Scherk was decided
two terms after Zapata, and the Court simply transposed Zapata’s
reasoning and conclusions onto arbitration clauses. Thus, in lockstep
with Zapata, the Court noted that a forum-selection clause should
control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside and that the
elimination of forum uncertainty by agreeing to a forum in advance “is
an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and
contracting.”129

the substantive law identified in the choice-of-law clause governs the interpretation of the forum
selection clause, while federal law governs the enforceability of the forum selection clause . . . .”).
124. See, e.g., Montoya v. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1263–64 (D.N.M. 2012)
(“The difference between a mandatory and permissive forum selection clause is that ‘[m]andatory
forum selection clauses contain clear language showing that jurisdiction is appropriate only in the
designated forum. In contrast, permissive forum selection clauses authorize jurisdiction in a designated
forum, but do not prohibit litigation elsewhere.’” (quoting Am. Soda, LLP v. U.S. Filter Wastewater Grp.,
428 F.3d 921, 926–27 (10th Cir. 2005))). Hence, before determining what law applies to determine the
validity and enforceability of a forum-selection clause, several courts have indicated that a threshold
inquiry involves deciding whether a forum-selection clause is mandatory or permissive.
125. See generally The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
126. Id. (enforcing forum-selection clause in the context of two sophisticated business entities
contractually agreeing to a foreign forum); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991)
(enforcing a forum-selection clause against consumers who purchased cruise line ticket).
127. 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 518 (quoting Zapata, 407 U.S. at 13–14); see also id. at 516 (“A contractual provision
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be applied is,
therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability
essential to any international business transaction.”).
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Three points are compelling about the Scherk decision, in which the
contested clause specified that any breach of the parties’ contractual
agreement would be referred to arbitration before the International
Chamber of Commerce in Paris.130 First, when Alberto-Culver, respondent,
sought to sue over disputed trademark issues, the Court upheld the
arbitration clause designating Paris as the forum based on the Court’s
Zapata reasoning. However, the Court also indicated that Illinois state
law would govern the dispute,131 because that state’s law also was
designated in the contract. The Court rendered this opinion without any
reflection on the threshold issue of what law applied to determine the
validity and enforceability of the choice-of-law provision, and it seems
odd to enforce a Paris forum but dictate application of Illinois state
law.132
Second, in exact contrast to the theme of this Article, the Scherk
Court determined that enforcement of arbitration clauses was desirable
because enforcement of these provisions would eliminate parties’
attempts to game the system. Thus, the Court noted, “[a] parochial refusal
by the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration
agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure
tactical litigation advantages.”133 As will be discussed, forum-selection

130. Id. at 508.
131. Id. at 519 n.13 (“Under some circumstances, the designation of arbitration in a certain place might
also be viewed as implicitly selecting the law of that place to apply to that transaction. In this case, however,
‘[t]he laws of the State of Illinois’ were explicitly made applicable by the arbitration agreement.”).
132. Summarizing the Supreme Court’s arbitration clause jurisprudence in several cases following
Scherk, the Eleventh Circuit concluded:
Together, these Supreme Court precedents propound several overarching themes:
(1) courts should apply a strong presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration and
choice clauses; (2) U.S. statutory claims are arbitrable, unless Congress has specifically
legislated otherwise; (3) choice-of-law clauses may be enforced even if the substantive law
applied in arbitration potentially provides reduced remedies (or fewer defenses) than those
available under U.S. law; and (4) even if a contract expressly says that foreign law governs,
. . . courts should not invalidate an arbitration agreement at the arbitration-enforcement
stage on the basis of speculation about what the arbitrator will do, as there will be a later
opportunity to review any arbitral award.
Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2011).
133. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517. The Court explained how the parties, in the absence of an arbitration
clause, might game the system:
In the present case, for example, it is not inconceivable that if Scherk had anticipated that
Alberto-Culver would be able in this country to enjoin resort to arbitration he might have
sought an order in France or some other country enjoining Alberto-Culver from proceeding
with its litigation in the United States. Whatever recognition the courts of this country might
ultimately have granted to the order of the foreign court, the dicey atmosphere of such a
legal no-man’s-land would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade,
and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international
commercial agreements.
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clauses and arbitration clauses may be viewed in exactly the opposite
fashion: as a means of unilateral jockeying to secure tactical litigation
advantage, which the Scherk majority eschewed.
Third, in analogizing arbitration clauses to forum-selection clauses
in reliance on Zapata, the Court adopted Zapata’s standards for
determining the validity and enforceability of arbitration clauses, as well.
Thus, a set of contract principles set forth in an admiralty case were
engrafted onto an arbitration clause in a land-based international
commercial dispute.134 But whether an arbitration clause constituted a
contract of adhesion was an issue for the arbitral tribunal, not the court
in which the clause was challenged.135
Scherk was a five-to-four decision. With significant prescience for
the subsequent evolution of forum-selection and arbitration clauses, the
Court’s four liberal Justices recognized the unfairness of transposing
Zapata rationales to arbitration clauses and objected to the Court’s
sweeping endorsement of Zapata in the international arbitration context:
This invocation of the “international contract” talisman might be
applied to a situation where, for example, an interest in a foreign
company or mutual fund was sold to an utterly unsophisticated
American citizen, with material fraudulent misrepresentations made in
this country. The arbitration clause could appear in the fine print of a
form contract, and still be sufficient to preclude recourse to our courts,
forcing the defrauded citizen to arbitration in Paris to vindicate his
rights.136

Notwithstanding this dissent, numerous courts post-Scherk and its
progeny have invoked Scherk to uphold arbitration clauses in international

Id.
134. The Eleventh Circuit summarized the Zapata “test” as holding that forum-selection clauses
are presumptively valid unless:
(1) their formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the plaintiff effectively would
be deprived of its day in court because of the inconvenience or unfairness of the chosen
forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a
remedy; or (4) enforcement of such provisions would contravene a strong public policy.
Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 1998).
135. See, e.g., JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 170 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding issue
of contract unconscionability was question for the arbitral tribunal to determine).
136. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 529 (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting).
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commercial contracts,137 and expanded these international commercial
holdings to domestic arbitration clauses, as well.138
Given the trajectory of forum-selection clause jurisprudence, it was
perhaps inevitable that Zapata principles eventually would be engrafted
from the international arbitration commercial context onto the domestic
consumer arbitration arena. Thus, in the latest expansion of the reach of
forum-selection clause doctrine, the Court determined that the Federal
Arbitration Act preempts application of state unconscionability
jurisprudence—in this case, California state law.139 In this regard, forumselection and arbitration clause jurisprudence essentially have converged
into the same highly restrictive and anti-consumer doctrine embodied in
the Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute line of cases.
Finally, it is well to consider whether, post-Atlantic Marine, there
are lingering procedural issues regarding the appropriate means to seek
enforcement of an arbitration clause. Thus, in an Atlantic Marine echochamber, some courts have considered requests to compel arbitration on a
Rule 12(b)(6) or a Rule 56 summary judgment motion, with the remedy
either a stay of proceedings or outright dismissal of the case.140 Other
defendants have moved for enforcement of an arbitration provision
under a Rule 12(b)(1) motion for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction,141
or a Rule 12(b)(3) motion for a lack of venue.142

137. See, e.g., Lindo, 652 F.3d at 1275 (“[U]nder . . . Supreme Court and Circuit precedent, there is
a strong presumption in favor of freely-negotiated contractual choice-of-law and forum-selection
provisions, and this presumption applies with special force in the field of international commerce.”);
see also JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 171 (“Moreover, as our Court has recently repeated, we are mindful
that ‘[t]he federal policy favoring the liberal enforcement of arbitration clauses . . . applies with particular
force in international disputes.’” (quoting Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. GE Med.
Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d 645, 654 (2d Cir. 2004))).
138. See, e.g., Huffman v. Hilltop Companies, 747 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2014) (enforcing arbitration
clause in employment litigation based on the Fair Labor Standards Act violations); Awuah v. Coverall N.
Am., Inc., 703 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2012) (requiring franchise to arbitrate claims against franchisor where
arbitrator clause was referenced only in other agreements); Gore v. Alltel Commc’ns LLC, 666 F.3d 1027
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding consumer fraud claim, among others, was subject to arbitration; whether an
arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable was a question for arbitrator in the first instance).
139. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
140. See, e.g., Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 771 (3d Cir. 2013)
(holding district court should employ Rule 56 summary judgment standards when considering a
motion to compel arbitration); Palcko v. Airborne Express, Inc., 372 F.3d 588, 597 (3rd Cir. 2004)
(considering motion to compel arbitration under Rule 12(b)(6) standard); Kaneff v. Del. Title Loans,
Inc., 587 F.3d 616, 620 (3d Cir. 2009).
141. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
142. See, e.g., Faulkenber v. CB Tax Franchise Sys., LP, 637 F.3d 801, 807 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding
Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss for improper venue is appropriate means to seek enforcement of an
arbitration clause provision); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902 (5th Cir.
2004) (“Although circuits are split on the issue of whether Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(3) is the proper
motion for seeking dismissal based on a forum selection or arbitration clause, . . . neither side has
substantively briefed the merits of the question. Because our court has accepted Rule 12(b)(3) as a
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Thus, one wonders what procedural effect Atlantic Marine has on
the enforcement of arbitration clauses. The Court in Atlantic Marine
determined that the appropriate procedural means for effectuating a
forum-selection clause is through a § 1404(a) transfer motion, applying
forum non conveniens analysis. But this conclusion has scant applicability
to the presence of an arbitration agreement in a party’s contractual
relationship because federal courts lack the power to transfer a case to an
arbitral tribunal.
Hence, enforcement of an arbitration provision must be accomplished
through some procedural vehicle other than a § 1404 transfer motion,
and subject to some other prevailing jurisprudential standards. In a postAtlantic Marine decision, the Seventh Circuit suggested that “[a]n
arbitration clause is simply a type of forum-selection clause, and a
motion seeking dismissal based on an agreement to arbitrate therefore
should be decided under Rule 12(b)(3).”143 How does this conclusion,
then, square with the Atlantic Marine analysis that forum-selection clauses
are not a matter of venue?

III. Forum-Selection Clauses in Consumer Contracts
Post- ATLANTIC MARINE
A. A Reprise on Gaming the System

1.

What Zapata Hath Wrought
In this post-Atlantic Marine era, one may trace a daisy chain of legal
authority essentially derived from Zapata and extending through AT&T
v. Concepcion. Thus, what originated as a doctrine in the context of

admiralty law in a dispute arising between sophisticated international
businesspersons has been transmuted over the decades into a narrowly
restrictive doctrine of presumptive validity of forum-selection and
arbitration clauses in consumer and nonconsumer contracts. Moreover,
the doctrine has embraced some peculiar eddies, such as the Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz decision where Burger King was able to sue its
franchisees in a Florida forum based not on a forum-selection clause, but
solely on a choice-of-law clause.144

proper method for seeking dismissal based on a forum selection clause, we need not decide whether a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion would be appropriate.” (citation omitted)).
143. Johnson v. Orkin, LLC, 556 F. App’x 543, 544 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
144. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481–82 (1985) (holding choice-of-law clause
designating application of Florida law placed franchisees on notice that disputes arising from franchise
agreement would be litigated in a Florida forum). In nearly thirty-five years of teaching the Burger King
decision, I have yet to find students with sympathy for Rudzewicz and MacShara, the franchisees, who
arguably fail to qualify as sophisticated businesspersons precisely because their Burger King franchise
failed.
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In recent years, the tentacles of forum-selection clause doctrine have
reached further and further—beyond nautical disasters, international
commercial trade agreements, domestic cruise line passengers—and
eventually ensnared domestic commercial agreements, ordinary consumer
contracts, employment agreements, brokerage agreements, and basically
any arrangement governed by contract. Moreover, once the Supreme
Court announced that arbitration clauses were a kind of forum-selection
clause, the courts easily embraced forum-selection clause jurisprudence
as applicable to arbitration clauses. Thus, the ultimate evolution of
Zapata jurisprudence was crowned in the Court’s Concepcion decision,
which accorded primacy to federal arbitration law as preempting state
unconscionability doctrine.145
The law of forum-selection and arbitration clause jurisprudence
might be summed up as follows:
(1) If a disaster occurs at sea in a contract governed by a forumselection clause, one might be able to prevail against a forum-selection
clause on unconscionability grounds, but probably not; where the
parties most likely were sophisticated businesspersons, the clause is
prima facie valid unless shown unreasonable; hence, the challenger will
lose;
(2) If a dispute arises as a consequence of an international
commercial transaction (land-based), one might be able to prevail
against a forum-selection clause on unconscionability grounds, but
probably not; where the parties were sophisticated businesspersons the
clause is prima facie valid unless shown unreasonable; hence, the
challenger will lose;
(3) If a dispute arises as a consequence of a domestic commercial
dispute (land-based), one may challenge a forum-selection clause
which, if presumptively valid as between sophisticated businesspersons
will be subject to a § 1404(a) transfer, pursuant to forum non
conveniens analysis, but no private right factors may be taken into
account, only limited public law factors; hence, the challenger will lose;
(4) If a dispute arises as a consequence of the presence of a
forum-selection clause in a passenger ticket, one may challenge a
forum-selection clause which, if presumptively valid, will be subject to a
§ 1404(a) transfer, pursuant to forum non conveniens analysis, but no
private right factors may be taken into account, only limited public law
factors; hence, the challenger will lose, and it will be of no consequence
that the corporation was sophisticated and the passenger was not;
(5) If a dispute arises as a consequence of the presence of a
forum-selection clause in a consumer contract (employment
agreement, brokerage agreement, etc.), one may challenge a forumselection clause which, if presumptively valid, will be subject to a
§ 1404(a) transfer, pursuant to forum non conveniens analysis, but no
private right factors may be taken into account, only limited public law
factors; hence, the challenger will lose, and it will be of no consequence

145. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
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that the corporation was sophisticated and the consumer had no idea
what was going on;
(6) If a dispute arises and the contract contains an arbitration
clause, a defendant may seek to enforce the arbitration clause under
Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), 12(b)(6) or Rule 56; federal law overrides any
countervailing state contract unconscionability principles, thereby
providing presumptive enforcement to the arbitration provision; the
determination of the validity of the arbitration clause is within the
purview of the arbitral tribunal; effectively the challenger will lose, if
the arbitration clause was between sophisticated businesspersons in the
international or domestic commercial markets; and it will be of no
consequence that the corporation was sophisticated and the consumer
had no idea what was going on.

If one sifts through the thousands of reported federal forumselection clause decisions since Zapata—and there are thousands of such
decisions146—one cannot help but be struck by the following fact: in
virtually every case the party seeking enforcement of the clause wins, and
the party seeking to invalidate the clause loses. This reality applies with
equal force and consequence to arbitration clauses since Scherk.147 Thus,
the doctrinal bar to prevailing on an unconscionability objection to a
forum-selection or arbitration clause is so great as to render that
challenge practically moot. In the realm of forum-selection and
arbitration clauses, the primacy of contract law prevails and the
possibility of invalidating such clauses on unconscionability grounds
largely remains illusory.

2.

Zapata’s First Premises: On Public Policy and Ousting a Court’s

Jurisdiction

As indicated above, current forum-selection and arbitration clause
jurisprudence chiefly derives from Zapata and its progeny, where the
Court reversed the historical aversion to forum-selection clauses.148 The
Zapata Court noted that federal and state courts had refused to enforce
such clauses on two primary grounds: (1) the clauses were contrary to
public policy, and (2) the effect of such clauses was to oust courts of their
jurisdiction.149 Adopting a “modern” view, the Court pivoted to
announce that forum-selection clauses were prima facie valid and

146. Search Results for “Forum-Selection Clause”, WestlawNext, http://www.westlawnext.com
(search “adv: ‘forum-selection clause’ & DA (aft 06-12-1972)” in “All Federal” category; click “cases”)
(reporting 9987 case citations as of Feb. 2, 2014).
147. Search
Results
for
“Enforce
Arbitration
Clause”,
WestlawNext,
http://www.westlawnext.com (search: “adv: ‘enforce arbitration clause’ & DA (aft 06-12-1972)” in “All
Federal” category; click “cases”).
148. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“Forum-selection clauses have
historically not been favored by American courts.”).
149. Id.
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enforceable unless the challenging party could show that the clause was
unreasonable under the circumstances.150
Several points are noteworthy in relation to the subsequent vast
expansion of Zapata principles. Regarding the underlying facts, the
Zapata Court’s repudiation of prior forum-selection clause jurisprudence
was limited to the admiralty context of that case.151 In addition, the Court
embraced its new forum-selection clause doctrine because the case arose
in the setting of an international commercial transaction that involved
sophisticated businesspersons on both sides of the contract.152 The Court
especially noted that its decision was supported by “present-day
commercial realities and expanding international trade,” and the fact
that “the elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on
a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element of
international trade.”153 Notwithstanding this limited factual context, the
Court expanded these rationales to embrace cruise line passenger tickets
in Carnival Cruise Lines—another admiralty jurisdiction case—enlarging
the reach of forum-selection clause jurisprudence to consumer
contracts.154
The Zapata Court’s legal rationales also bear scrutiny. The Court
analogized its new position on forum-selection clauses as equivalent to
parties’ consensual waiver of notice.155 The problem, however, is that
service of process has always been a waivable defense,156 while the same
cannot be said for subject matter jurisdiction, which is not consensually
waivable by the parties.157 To reach the conclusion that subject matter
jurisdiction is not waived by virtue of a forum-selection clause one must
first conclude that such clauses are not jurisdictional, as many courts
have so decided.158

150. Id. at 10.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 10–11.
153. Id. at 13, 15.
154. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594–95 (1991).
155. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 10–11 (citing Nat’l Equip Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964)).
156. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1)–(2); Royster v. Mohr, No. 2:11-CV-1163, 2013 WL 2404065, at *2
(S.D. Ohio May 31, 2013) (“The waivable defenses listed in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) are lack of personal
jurisdiction, improper venue, insufficient process, and insufficient service of process.”).
157. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); 5C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1393 (3d ed. 2004) (“The final defense expressly preserved against waiver as expressly set
forth in Federal Rule 12(h)(3), is a challenge to the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. . . .
[T]he federal courts have made it clear beyond peradventure that not only is it impossible to foreclose
the assertion of this defense by the passage of time or the notion of estoppel, but also it is impossible
to cure or waive a defect of subject matter jurisdiction by consent of the parties.”).
158. See, e.g., Auto. Mechs. Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA,
502 F.3d 740, 743 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Enforcement of a forum selection clause (including an arbitration
clause) is not jurisdictional; it is a waivable defense . . . .”); Nat’l Renal Alliance, LLC v. GAIA
Healthcare Sys., LLC, No. 3:10-0872, 2010 WL 4659804, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 9, 2010) (holding issue

Mullenix-66.3.doc (Do Not Delete)

April 2015]

3/23/2015 5:08 PM

GAMING THE SYSTEM

753

The Zapata court further rejected the argument that a forumselection clause ousted a court of its jurisdiction based on the theory that
the court exercised its jurisdiction to determine the validity and
enforceability of the clause in the first instance. In rejecting the “ouster
of jurisdiction” argument, the court explained:
The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to
“oust” a court of jurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal
fiction. It appears to rest at core on historical judicial resistance to any
attempt to reduce the power and business of a particular court and has
little place in an era when all courts are overloaded and when
businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets. It
reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of
other tribunals. No one seriously contends in this case that the forumselection clause “ousted” the District Court of jurisdiction over
Zapata’s action. The threshold question is whether that court should
have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than give effect to the
legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their freely
negotiated agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum clause.159

The Zapata Court’s facile rejection of the “ouster of jurisdiction”
theory, however, suggests that perhaps that doctrine deserved a more
decent burial. A long line of cases undergirded this theory, which
traditionally was coupled with a recognition that forum-selection clauses
were against public policy.160 The Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. Monrosa
decision—repudiated by the Zapata Court—indicated:
Contract provisions intended to oust courts of their jurisdiction in
advance, as distinguished from provisions merely imposing conditions
on the exercise of the right to sue, are void. This rule has been
frequently considered in determining the validity of contracts as to
venue, periods of limitation, notice or demand, and evidence.161

The Carbon Black decision further noted that in England and the United
States, it was settled law that a court’s jurisdiction could not be ousted by
the private agreement of individuals made in advance, private persons
were incompetent to make such binding contracts, and all such contracts
were illegal and void as against public policy.162

of forum-selection clause is an independent contractual concern created by the actions of the parties,
and is not linked to the inherent subject matter jurisdiction of the court).
159. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 12.
160. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958) (finding
forum-selection clause unenforceable; reiterating the traditional view of many American courts that
“agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the jurisdiction of the courts are
contrary to public policy and will not be enforced”); Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L. Smit & Co.’s
Internationale Sleepdienst, 154 F. Supp. 886, 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (“Such agreements, particularly
those calling for exclusive jurisdiction in a foreign court, are not looked upon with favor and will not
be enforced by the Federal courts if they are unreasonable in themselves or in the effect they may
have on the rights of the parties to the dispute.”).
161. Carbon Black Export, 254 F. 2d at 300–01 n.9.
162. Id.
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However, in rejecting the “ouster of jurisdiction” theory, the Zapata
Court did not altogether repudiate public policy challenges to forumselection clauses. Thus, the Court stated, “[a] contractual choice-offorum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would
contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought,
whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”163 The Court further
noted that “selection of a remote forum to apply differing foreign law to
an essentially American controversy might contravene an important
public policy of the forum.”164
Zapata’s legacy has had a substantial impact on the evolving
jurisprudence of forum-selection and arbitration clauses, not only with
regard to the expansion of that decision’s scope, but also in terms of
arguments lost. Thus, the Zapata Court effectively eliminated the “ouster
of jurisdiction” argument from the forum-selection clause conversation.
Moreover, public policy arguments have receded or failed to gain
traction in subsequent cases. Finally, the Court’s Concepcion decision,
giving primacy to federal arbitration law over countervailing state law,165
hammered a definitive nail in the public policy coffin.
B. The Need for Consumer Protection

1.

The Misguided Expansion to Consumer Agreements

The impetus for a radical revision of forum-selection clause doctrine
originated in the context of international shipping and transnational
commercial transactions conducted between sophisticated contracting
parties. Over time, the Court engrafted its revised doctrine onto any
contractual arrangements entered into by anyone, embracing the realms
of consumer and noncommercial contracts. In the Atlantic Marine decision,
the Court further extended its forum-selection clause jurisprudence to
conclude that by consensually agreeing to a forum-selection clause, a
prospective plaintiff effectively has waived its forum “privilege,” thereby
overriding the longstanding deference that courts have paid to a
plaintiff’s choice of forum.166
163. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 15 (holding public policy was not offended by enforcement of the forumselection clause in that case).
164. Id. at 17.
165. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011).
166. Atlantic Marine found that:
[T]he plaintiff’s choice of forum merits no weight. Rather, as the party defying the forumselection clause, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that transfer to the forum for
which the parties bargained is unwarranted. Because plaintiffs are ordinarily allowed to
select whatever forum they consider most advantageous (consistent with jurisdictional and
venue limitations), we have termed their selection the “plaintiff’s venue privilege.” But
when a plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forum—presumably in
exchange for other binding promises by the defendant—the plaintiff has effectively
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While the Court’s forum-selection clause jurisprudence carries force
in its original international commercial context, the extension of these
principles to ordinary consumer transactions is misguided, unprincipled,
and ultimately unfair.167 The further expansion of these principles to the
realm of arbitration clauses constitutes a one-two punch to unsuspecting
consumers in their everyday lives. The Court accomplished this
expansion of forum-selection and arbitration clause doctrine into the
consumer arena in its Carnival Cruise Lines and Concepcion decisions.168
The Court in Carnival Cruise Lines held that a forum-selection
clause was dispositive of the jurisdictional issue and essentially was
governed by principles articulated in Zapata.169 A seven-Justice majority
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view that a non-negotiated forum-selection
clause in a form ticket is never enforceable simply because it does not
result from bargaining.170 Instead, the Court suggested that forumselection clauses in consumer contracts should be subject to a refined
Zapata test of reasonableness.171
The Justices identified four reasons why the forum-selection clause
in the cruise line ticket was reasonable. First, the provision limited the
places where the cruise line could be sued, and, because ships travel to
many locales, the cruise line had an interest in not being subjected to
litigation in multiple forums.172 Second, such clauses eliminate confusion
over the place of litigation, reducing litigation costs that might result
from jurisdictional motions.173 Third, such clauses conserve judicial
resources that might otherwise be devoted to deciding jurisdictional
issues.174 And fourth, that “it stands to reason that passengers who
purchase tickets containing a forum clause . . . benefit in the form of
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting
the fora in which it may be sued.”175
The major policy reasons underlying the enforcement of forumselection clauses are that they ensure the certainty of the place of suit
exercised its “venue privilege” before a dispute arises. Only that initial choice deserves
deference, and the plaintiff must bear the burden of showing why the court should not
transfer the case to the forum to which the parties agreed.
Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581–82 (2013) (citing Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 635 (1964)).
167. See generally Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 82; Mullenix, The Titanic of Worst
Decisions, supra note 82.
168. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
169. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 590 (1991). This portion of the analysis
is adapted from Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 82, at 340–41.
170. Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593.
171. Id. at 593–94.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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and reduce cost and delay, thereby enhancing judicial administration.
But as the thousands of reported forum-selection clause decisions
suggest, this has simply proven not to be true.176 Instead, forum-selection
clauses have contributed much litigation, great expense, and a good deal
of delay, usually resulting in dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. Because the
effect of these clauses is ultimately to make many plaintiffs’ cases go
away, in that sense the provisions can be said to have a docket-clearing
benefit. But why defendants should be given a preference in where they
are sued is inexplicable and ultimately unjustifiable.
The Court in Carnival Cruise Lines bolstered its extension of forumselection clause doctrine to consumer contracts by explaining that
consumers enjoyed an economic pass-along of the benefits of these
clauses. But to date, empirical studies have not demonstrated such
economic pass-along to consumers, or how forum-selection clauses
actually benefit consumers entrapped by what essentially constitutes a
defendant’s unilateral forum preference.
The entire doctrine surrounding the sanctity of forum-selection and
arbitration clauses in the consumer arena essentially has been
constructed based on a series of somewhat fantastical premises about
these agreements. It first assumes that the contracting parties consist of a
(sophisticated) consumer and a corporate or business entity. The
doctrine assumes a knowledgeable consumer who understands that at
some future point, the consumer may be involved in a dispute with the
business entity. The doctrine assumes that this consumer understands
what a forum choice means (or for that matter, what a choice-of-law or
arbitration provision entails). It assumes that this consumer understands
the consequences of a forum or choice-of-law designation. The doctrine
assumes that the consumer has read the agreement and noticed and read
the forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration clause. The doctrine
assumes that the consumer willingly agrees, in advance of any dispute, to
waive its choice of forum (or choice of law, or access to the adjudicative
system). The doctrine assumes that the consumer (or employee, or small
consumer/investor) is receiving some unspecified economic benefit from
agreeing to the forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration provision.
The doctrine assumes, as Justice Alito put it in Atlantic Marine, that the
consumer knowingly and willingly waives its “venue privilege.”177
But what if none of this—apart from the existence of contracting
parties—is true? In the current age of computer-generated online
contractual form agreements that require consumers to scroll through
dozens of dense, small-print online boxes that allow for no modification
or negotiation of terms, but then requires the consumer to “click Agree,”

176. See Mullenix, Another Easy Case, supra note 82, at 360.
177. Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581–82 (2013).
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it seems unreasonable to base enforcement of these clauses on the
premise that a consumer could be said to knowingly and willingly have
waived their venue privilege as a consequence.

2.

What Is to Be Done?

In the consumer context, the evolution of forum-selection, choiceof-law, and arbitration clause jurisprudence has resulted in a system that
unfairly favors corporate defendants. This jurisprudence now extends
beyond consumer contracts to all types of agreements, including
employment and brokerage contracts. Because the Court has sanctified
these provisions on the basis of contract law, there is no level playing
field among contracting parties and corporate preferences for forum
choice, applicable law, or alternative dispute resolution effectively
prevail in all cases.
As long as courts continue to construe these clauses in the context
of contract law, consumers will continue to be vulnerable to corporate
litigation manipulation in businesses’ favor. To resist or reject such
manipulation requires revisiting discarded first principles: namely,
whether forum-selection clauses are jurisdictional and whether they
effectively oust courts of jurisdiction. As discussed above, federal courts
historically have long resisted all manner of creative manipulation of
jurisdiction, venue, and applicable law to game the litigation system for
strategic advantage. Viewing forum-selection, choice-of-law, and arbitration
clauses as creative means to manipulate jurisdiction under the cloak of
contract law might result in a different judicial reception to these
provisions.
In addition, consumers would fare better with meaningful recourse
to public policy arguments that eschew such provisions, arguments the
courts have effectively eviscerated. The Court’s substantial federalization
of applicable law relating to forum-selection and arbitration clauses has
left little room for countervailing state law contravening such clauses,
especially state law doctrines of contract unconscionability. However,
given the Court’s increasingly severe jurisprudential arc regarding forumselection and arbitration clauses—as well as the Justices’ ideological
predispositions—the likelihood of any federal doctrinal shift that is more
sympathetic to consumers seems implausible.
The procedural and substantive unfairness engendered by these
clauses that affect the lives of consumers, employees, and others will not
be remedied through doctrinal elaboration and cannot be remedied
through rule amendments. If consumers are to be afforded meaningful
relief from such clauses,178 then federal statutory substantive law is
178. See, e.g., The Cruise Industry Passenger Bill of Rights, Cruise Lines Int’l Ass’n,
http://www.cruising.org/regulatory/issues-facts/safety-and-security/cruise-industry-passenger-bill-rights
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needed to determine the validity and enforcement of a forum-selection
or choice-of-law clause challenged by a plaintiff179 or the validity and
enforcement of an arbitration clause sought by a defendant.
In this regard, the federal collusive joinder statute is a marvel of
simplicity.180 It simply states, “[a] district court shall not have jurisdiction
of a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been
improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of
such court.” To address the growing problem of adhesive forum-selection
(and similar) clauses, why can we not have a statute that simply states:
A district court shall not have jurisdiction or venue of a civil action in
which a party of superior bargaining strength has drafted, imposed, and
made a contract of adhesion designing a particular forum, applicable
law, or arbitration, relegating the subscribing party only to the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it, and the clauses are
unfairly one-sided.

This type of statute would, at the outset, exclude from its purview
Zapata-style cases arising in the international or domestic commercial
contexts that involve sophisticated business partners on both sides of a
deal. Instead, this statute would focus on the particular situations of
consumer, employment, and brokerage contracts where one party has
superior bargaining strength and the subscribing party is subjected to a
take-it-or-leave contractual arrangement.
In such cases, modifying the rules relating to presumptions and
allocations of burdens of proof might also work towards leveling the
playing field. Thus, in such situations, courts should not engage in a
threshold presumption of validity favoring the provisions’ drafter;
instead, such clauses should be presumptively invalid until shown to
constitute an informed meeting of the minds and actual consensual
agreement. Moreover, the party seeking enforcement should have the
burden of demonstrating the validity and enforceability of these

(last visited Apr. 4, 2015). This industry self-regulation was highly criticized for its failure to protect
consumers from forum-selection clauses in passenger tickets. See Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise

Passenger’s Rights and Remedies 2014: The Costa Concordia Disaster: One Year Later, Many More
Incidents Both on Board Megaships and During Risky Shore Excursions, 38 Tul. Mar. L.J. 515, 526
(2014) (“While superficially encouraging, the Passenger Bill of Rights promises little more than what
cruise lines are already legally obligated to do and does nothing to level the litigation playing field,
which is obstructed by roadblocks . . . . For example, if [the Cruise Line International Association
(“CLIA”)] really wants to help cruise passengers, then cruise lines should stop inserting Miami,
Florida, forum selection clauses into ticket contracts and allow injured passengers to sue in a forum
convenient to them.”).
179. Senator Charles Schumer of New York, following CLIA’s announcement of its Industry
Passenger Bill of Rights, indicated that he planned to introduce legislation to protect cruise line
passengers. To date, no such legislation has been introduced. See Letter from Sen. Charles Schumer to
Christine Duffy, CEO & President, Cruise Line Int’l Ass’n (Mar. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=341068.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012) (parties collusively joined or made).
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provisions, rather than imposing contrary burdens on the party seeking
to deny enforcement. This shifting of burdens is precisely the doctrine
that courts apply when evaluating a plaintiff’s motion alleging
impermissible collusive joinder under 28 U.S.C. § 1359.181 Finally, when a
defendant seeks enforcement, the statute could be implemented on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion—the procedural question that dominated the
Atlantic Marine litigation.

Conclusion
Historically, Congress and the federal courts have acted to constrain
or prevent prefiling actions by prospective litigants who intended to
confer strategic litigation advantage if a dispute arose in the future. From
the broadest prospective, our legal system has simultaneously encouraged
zealous representation while at the same time eschewed certain types of
litigation gamesmanship. In particular, legislative bodies and the courts
have been sensitive to prefiling forum-shopping gambits designed to
secure a preferable forum or applicable law. Consequently, many of the
legislative or judicial initiatives to constrain such behaviors have been
aimed at forum-shopping techniques in their varying and creative
incarnations.
The legislature and the judiciary have repeatedly intervened to
thwart litigation gamesmanship. By statute, Congress has precluded
individuals from engaging in sham contractual assignments to create
federal jurisdiction and, in decedents’ estate cases, effectively ended the
practice of appointing out-of-state executors to gain entry to federal
court after a decedent’s demise. CAFA and the cases construing it
represent a large-scale legislative and judicial effort to suppress forumshopping gamesmanship in the class action arena. By doctrinal
pronouncements, courts have foiled plaintiffs’ attempts to gain litigation
advantage through stratagems such as reincorporating over state lines to
confer diversity jurisdiction or transferring litigation to gain preferable
law in another venue. While many of these constraints have been directed
181. According to the District Court for the Southern District of New York:
To rebut this presumption, the party invoking jurisdiction must “articulate a legitimate
business purpose for the assignment,” . . . and bears a “heavy burden of proof.” Indeed,
“simply offering evidence of a business reason will be insufficient to rebut the presumption.
Instead, the burden falls on the party asserting diversity to demonstrate that the reason given
for the assignment is legitimate, not pretextual.” . . . “In assessing whether an assignment is
improper or collusive, courts consider, among other things, ‘the assignee’s lack of a previous
connection with the claim assigned; the remittance by the assignee to the assignor of any
recovery; whether the assignor actually controls the conduct of the litigation; the timing of the
assignment; the lack of any meaningful consideration for the assignment; and the underlying
purpose of the assignment.’”
LCE Lux HoldCo S.a.r.l. v. Entretenimiento GM de Mexico S.A. de C.V., 287 F.R.D. 230, 239 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (internal citations omitted).
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at parties’ jurisdictional manipulation, the legislature and judiciary have
similarly imposed limitations on venue manipulation.
Most reform initiatives have been directed toward litigants’ prefiling
actions intended to game the system. There is scant reason, however, not
to apply such forum-shopping constraints on defendants’ prefiling actions
where the prospective defendants’ purpose is similarly to game the
system and accomplish the defendants’ preference for forum selection,
applicable law, or arbitration. That is the practical effect of these clauses
that corporate defendants routinely insert in consumer and employment
contracts, which are enforced against largely unsuspecting and
unsophisticated individuals. In the consumer arena, the expansion of
forum-selection clause jurisprudence to arbitration clauses has exacerbated
the inequity visited upon the vulnerable and conferred tremendous
advantage on the business entities that customarily include such provisions
in their contracts.
The reality is that scarcely any plaintiff in the post-Zapata era who
has sought to invalidate a forum-selection, choice-of-law, or arbitration
clause has been able to successfully prevail on a contract unreasonableness
defense. In a world where the Court has now announced that courts
should give no weight to a plaintiff’s historical venue privilege as a
consequence of the presence of a forum-selection clause, this doctrine
instead unfairly confers a venue privilege on the contracting defendant.
The imbalance of equities in forum-selection clause jurisprudence should
be remedied by changing the narrative that gives primacy to contract law
and returning the conversation to that of jurisdictional ouster, litigation
gamesmanship, and public policy concerns.

